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## at law

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# Investigational Drugs and the Constitution

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by Rebecca Dresser

In May 2006, a federal court of appeals issued a decision with radical implications for U.S. drug regulation. The ruling in *Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach* expands the terminally ill person's ability to gain access to drugs early in the testing process.<sup>1</sup> If the decision stands, it will restrict significantly the Food and Drug Administration's control over investigational drugs.

The decision was surprising in several respects. The decision itself was a surprise, for the case had previously attracted little national attention. Also, the decision adopted a much broader concept of constitutional rights than did the precedents it relied on, and it reflected a naive impression of drug development.

In these and other respects, the decision departs from the mainstream scientific and ethical understanding of clinical research policy. Indeed, the decision is interesting in that it embraces popular ideas about the miracles that can occur when terminally ill patients gain access to novel agents. It emphasizes the benefits available from early-phase investigational drugs and shows little awareness of the harms early access could produce.

### The Abigail Alliance Case

Grass-roots patient advocacy lies at the heart of the case. The events leading to the lawsuit occurred in 2000, when drug companies were testing two new cancer drugs. Many patients not in the trials sought early access to the

drugs. The drug companies voluntarily operated a small early access program, but they were unwilling to expand the program to satisfy patient demand.

Abigail Burroughs, a twenty-one-year-old college student, was one of the patients denied admission to the early access program.<sup>2</sup> After she died, her father founded the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs to promote speedier approval of new drugs. With the assistance of the Washington Legal Foundation, a libertarian law and policy center, the Alliance petitioned the FDA to liberalize its early access policies. The FDA denied the request. The Alliance then went to the federal district court, which dismissed the case on grounds that there were no constitutional claims that would justify overturning the FDA denial.

The appellate court was more sympathetic to the Alliance's point of view, however. Two judges on the three-judge panel agreed that terminally ill patients have a constitutional right "to decide, without FDA interference, whether to assume the risks of using potentially life-saving investigational drugs that the FDA has yet to approve for commercial marketing, but that the FDA has determined, after phase I clinical human trials, are safe enough for further testing."

### Existing FDA Policies

Current FDA regulations require three phases of human testing before a drug may be marketed for clinical

use. Phase I tests are conducted on twenty to eighty subjects and are designed to measure adverse effects associated with increasing doses of a new agent. The regulations also establish a secondary objective for phase I trials: "if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness."

Drugs that appear to produce an acceptable safety profile may then enter phase II testing, which may involve up to several hundred subjects. Here, the goal is "to evaluate the effectiveness of the [new agent] and to determine the common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug." If there is evidence that the agent produces an acceptable range of potential harms and benefits, the drug sponsor may conduct larger phase III trials. If these trials give acceptable evidence of effectiveness and safety, the sponsor may seek FDA approval for marketing to patients.

Current FDA regulations permit early access in certain situations. The FDA has a "compassionate use" program that allows companies to distribute drugs in voluntary programs, including one that governed access to the drugs Abigail Burroughs tried to obtain. The Accelerated Approval and Fast Track programs represent additional FDA efforts to hasten and expand seriously ill patients' access to new drugs.<sup>3</sup> For the Abigail Alliance supporters, however, these programs are insufficient to meet patients' interests.

According to FDA critics, a major problem is the agency's prohibition on commercial marketing of drugs before they are approved for clinical use. The Abigail Alliance wants the FDA to abandon the prohibition on drug marketing because it reduces the financial incentive for companies to offer early-phase drugs to patients outside clinical trials. The Alliance wants to substitute a rule allowing companies to market post-phase I drugs to "mentally competent, terminally ill adult patients who have no alternative government-approved treatment options." [See John Robertson's essay in this issue for further discussion of the case's implications.]

## Constitutional Analysis

The *Abigail Alliance* judges cited two U.S. Supreme Court decisions as support for the constitutional right. The judges relied most heavily on the Court's physician-assisted suicide case, *Washington v. Glucksberg*.<sup>4</sup> In *Glucksberg*, the Court held that terminally ill patients have no constitutional right to obtain physician-assisted suicide. Because there was no traditional recognition of such a right, states were free to prohibit physician-assisted suicide.

Despite the Court's negative holding, the majority's *Abigail Alliance* opinion said that *Glucksberg* supported a constitutional right to obtain investigational drugs. Two parts of *Glucksberg* justified this view. First, the Supreme Court said that constitutional rights must be narrowly described. Noting that the Alliance "claims neither an unfettered right of access to all new or investigational new drugs nor a right to receive treatment at government expense," the judges thought that the Alliance's claim easily met *Glucksberg's* demand for a narrow due process right.

The *Abigail Alliance* majority also thought that the plaintiffs satisfied a second *Glucksberg* requirement. This was the Supreme Court's demand claiming that substantive due process rights demonstrate a long-standing tradition of protection. According to the majority judges, traditionally protected rights associated with bodily integrity and self-preservation encompassed the right to obtain investigational new drugs. Federal drug regulation is a fairly recent phenomenon, which demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction that tradition recognized the freedom of people seeking life-saving medications.

The *Abigail Alliance* judges also looked to the *Cruzan* case as a source of support.<sup>5</sup> The Supreme Court's recognition of a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment had as a "logical corollary . . . that an individual must also be free to decide for herself whether to assume any known or unknown risks of taking a medication that might prolong her life." According to the *Abigail Alliance* judges, *Cruzan* demonstrated the Supreme

Court's support for a liberty interest in obtaining drugs that had cleared phase I trials.

The dissenting judge in *Abigail Alliance* found much to criticize in the majority's analysis. The majority, he said, wrongly interpreted *Glucksberg* and *Cruzan*. First, the majority failed to supply evidence that the claimed right was part of the nation's traditions; instead, it created a new right based on several general principles, such as the right to self-preservation. But *Glucksberg* itself said that courts should not infer constitutionally protected liberty interests from broad concepts like those the majority described. Second, *Cruzan* recognized only the individual's right to be free of forced treatment, not to affirmative access to experimental agents. Third, "the history of drug regulation in this country does not evidence a tradition of protecting a right of access to drugs; instead, it evidences government responding to new risks as they are presented." Indeed, he said, Supreme Court precedents suggest that experimental drugs present scientific questions that should be resolved by Congress and regulatory agencies, not judges.

## Uncertain Consequences

The majority's understanding of investigational drug testing is deficient in several ways. The majority seems to assume that most drugs that get through phase I testing will eventually be approved because their expected benefits will outweigh harms. The judges also seem to assume that phase I testing, which primarily examines safety, yields high-quality data on effectiveness. They seem to assume, too, that data from twenty to eighty people can supply sufficient evidence for patients and doctors to make informed decisions about new agents.

These assumptions led the majority to overlook the downsides of early access. The majority implied that terminally ill patients have little to lose in taking post-phase I drugs. In fact, an investigational drug may hasten death and significantly reduce quality of life. The majority ruling also raises slippery slope

questions. For example, the majority's analysis would support a right to obtain "futile" treatments rejected by most of the medical community.

The majority's ruling could also impose serious social harm. Drug testing for safety and effectiveness primarily helps future patients. To advance knowledge, some subjects participating in clinical trials must be assigned to standard therapy. Trial participation also involves special examinations and other inconveniences. Obtaining early-phase drugs through a physician would be a more attractive option for many people. Thus subject recruitment will be more difficult if the majority's expanded access ruling goes into effect.

It is unclear whether the *Abigail Alliance* ruling will stand. Although the majority found that patients had a constitutional claim, it sent the case back to the lower court to determine whether the FDA's current policies are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The FDA may indeed meet this standard. The FDA has also petitioned for a rehearing by the full court of appeals, which could overturn the ruling.

The FDA is now engaged in an effort to redesign the drug testing process, which could lead to a more varied and flexible approach and would speed drug approval when appropriate.<sup>6</sup> The revisions are likely to incorporate the views of many experts and consumers. As the *Abigail Alliance* dissent asserted, drug testing policy should be developed by regulatory agencies and Congress, not by federal judges.

## Acknowledgments

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1. 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

2. M. Kaufman, "Court Backs Experimental Drugs for Dying Patients," *Washington Post*, May 3, 2006; C. Leonnig, "Group Sues for Access to Experimental Drugs," *Washington Post*, July 29, 2003.

3. See 21 C.F.R. Parts 312, 314 (2006).

4. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).

5. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).

6. S. Okie, "Access before Approval: A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?" *New England Journal of Medicine* 355 (2006): 437-40.

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